论文标题
永久污泥:减慢和施加网络攻击者的成本
Sludge for Good: Slowing and Imposing Costs on Cyber Attackers
论文作者
论文摘要
选择体系结构描述了向人们提供选择的设计。推销是一个旨在使“良好”结果变得容易的方面,例如使用密码计鼓励密码强。相反,污泥是摩擦的,它提高了交易成本,通常被视为对用户的负面影响。为了扭转这个概念,我们建议将污泥用于积极的网络安全结果,通过进攻端将污泥用于消费攻击者的时间和其他资源。 迄今为止,大多数网络防御措施已设计为最佳强大,有效,并尽快消除或消除攻击者。我们的免费方法是部署旨在最大程度地消费攻击者时间和其他资源的防御措施,同时对受害者造成尽可能少的损害。这与零信任和类似的心态是一致的。污泥策略通过使用欺骗和真实的设计功能在攻击之前,之中和之后对攻击者进行策略性部署摩擦,从而引入了具有成本较大的网络防御。我们介绍有效污泥的特征,并显示从光到重污泥的连续性。我们描述了攻击者的定量和定性成本,并为在实践中部署污泥提供了实际考虑。最后,我们研究了美国政府行动的现实例子,以使网络对手感到沮丧并施加成本。
Choice architecture describes the design by which choices are presented to people. Nudges are an aspect intended to make "good" outcomes easy, such as using password meters to encourage strong passwords. Sludge, on the contrary, is friction that raises the transaction cost and is often seen as a negative to users. Turning this concept around, we propose applying sludge for positive cybersecurity outcomes by using it offensively to consume attackers' time and other resources. To date, most cyber defenses have been designed to be optimally strong and effective and prohibit or eliminate attackers as quickly as possible. Our complimentary approach is to also deploy defenses that seek to maximize the consumption of the attackers' time and other resources while causing as little damage as possible to the victim. This is consistent with zero trust and similar mindsets which assume breach. The Sludge Strategy introduces cost-imposing cyber defense by strategically deploying friction for attackers before, during, and after an attack using deception and authentic design features. We present the characteristics of effective sludge, and show a continuum from light to heavy sludge. We describe the quantitative and qualitative costs to attackers and offer practical considerations for deploying sludge in practice. Finally, we examine real-world examples of U.S. government operations to frustrate and impose cost on cyber adversaries.