论文标题
拓扑距离游戏
Topological Distance Games
论文作者
论文摘要
我们介绍了一类战略游戏，其中将代理分配给拓扑图的节点，而代理的实用程序取决于代理商对其他代理商的固有效用以及与这些代理在拓扑图上的距离。这种拓扑距离游戏（TDGS）的模型提供了联盟形成几个重要环境的重要方面的吸引力组合，包括（可分离）享乐游戏，社交距离游戏和Schelling游戏。我们研究了TDG中稳定结果的存在和复杂性 - 例如，虽然一般来说，跳跃稳定分配可能不存在，但我们表明存在在几种特殊情况下可以保证存在。我们还研究了通过进行有益跳跃引起的动力学。
We introduce a class of strategic games in which agents are assigned to nodes of a topology graph and the utility of an agent depends on both the agent's inherent utilities for other agents as well as her distance from these agents on the topology graph. This model of topological distance games (TDGs) offers an appealing combination of important aspects of several prominent settings in coalition formation, including (additively separable) hedonic games, social distance games, and Schelling games. We study the existence and complexity of stable outcomes in TDGs -- for instance, while a jump stable assignment may not exist in general, we show that the existence is guaranteed in several special cases. We also investigate the dynamics induced by performing beneficial jumps.
