论文标题
社会机制设计：做出最大可接受的决定
Social Mechanism Design: Making Maximally Acceptable Decisions
论文作者
论文摘要
代理人不仅在乎集体决策的结果，而且关心决策的做出结果。在许多情况下，结果和程序都会影响代理人是否将决定视为合法，合理或可接受。我们为集体决策提出了一个新型模型，该模型考虑了代理人的偏好及其对偏好聚集过程的高阶问题。为此，我们（1）提出了自然，合理的偏好结构并建立其关键特性，（2）开发了汇总这些偏好以最大化决策可接受性的机制，并且（3）表征我们接受最大化机制的性能。我们将我们的一般方法应用于二分法的特定设置，并比较不同类型的代理人中最糟糕的接受率。我们还在特殊情况下选择了规则选择的情况，即修正程序，Abramowitz，Shapiro和Talmon（2021）提出的方法实现了某些代理类型的普遍接受。
Agents care not only about the outcomes of collective decisions but also about how decisions are made. In many cases, both the outcome and the procedure affect whether agents see a decision as legitimate, justifiable, or acceptable. We propose a novel model for collective decisions that takes into account both the preferences of the agents and their higher order concerns about the process of preference aggregation. To this end we (1) propose natural, plausible preference structures and establish key properties thereof, (2) develop mechanisms for aggregating these preferences to maximize the acceptability of decisions, and (3) characterize the performance of our acceptance-maximizing mechanisms. We apply our general approach to the specific setting of dichotomous choice, and compare the worst-case rates of acceptance achievable among populations of agents of different types. We also show in the special case of rule selection, i.e., amendment procedures, the method proposed by Abramowitz, Shapiro, and Talmon (2021) achieves universal acceptance with certain agent types.
