论文标题
当分歧点是私人信息时，两人讨价还价
Two-Person Bargaining when the Disagreement Point is Private Information
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑了两人讨价还价问题，其中（仅）分歧结果是私人（并且可能是相关的）信息，并且常识是分歧效率低下。我们表明，如果帕累托边境是线性的，则促进后机制的结果不能取决于分歧的回报。如果边境是非线性的，那么当分歧回报是独立的或最多有两种类型的播放器时，结果将继续保持。我们讨论了这些结果对公理讨价还价理论的含义以及机理设计中的全面盈余提取。
We consider two-person bargaining problems in which (only) the disagreement outcome is private (and possibly correlated) information and it is common knowledge that disagreement is inefficient. We show that if the Pareto frontier is linear, the outcome of an ex post efficient mechanism cannot depend on the disagreement payoffs. If the frontier is non-linear, the result continues to hold when the disagreement payoffs are independent or there is a player with at most two types. We discuss implications of these results for axiomatic bargaining theory and for full surplus extraction in mechanism design.
