论文标题
定价和电动汽车充电平衡
Pricing and Electric Vehicle Charging Equilibria
论文作者
论文摘要
我们在电动汽车（EV）充电游戏中研究平衡，这是一个为EV电源需求管理的分散充电控制策略所固有的成本最小化游戏。在我们的模型中，每个用户都优化了其总成本，即直接电力成本和间接不满成本。我们表明，以特定价格独立的不满成本来考虑与普遍的看法相反，放牧只发生在较低的EV吸收中。此外，对于线性和逻辑上的不满功能都是如此。我们研究了存在价格曲线的问题，以引起所需的平衡。我们定义了两种类型的平衡，分布式和非分布的平衡，并表明在物流不满意下，只有可行的定价，只有非分布的平衡。在线性情况下，两种类型的平衡都是可能的，但价格歧视对于诱导分布的平衡是必要的。最后，我们表明，在对称EV使用者的情况下，调解无法改善NASH均衡。
We study equilibria in an Electric Vehicle (EV) charging game, a cost minimization game inherent to decentralized charging control strategy for EV power demand management. In our model, each user optimizes its total cost which is sum of direct power cost and the indirect dissatisfaction cost. We show that, taking player specific price independent dissatisfaction cost in to account, contrary to popular belief, herding only happens at lower EV uptake. Moreover, this is true for both linear and logistic dissatisfaction functions. We study the question of existence of price profiles to induce a desired equilibrium. We define two types of equilibria, distributed and non-distributed equilibria, and show that under logistic dissatisfaction, only non-distributed equilibria are possible by feasibly setting prices. In linear case, both type of equilibria are possible but price discrimination is necessary to induce distributed equilibria. Finally, we show that in the case of symmetric EV users, mediation cannot improve upon Nash equilibria.
