论文标题
独裁者游戏中的社会公平规范，具有基于声誉的角色分配
Social norms of fairness with reputation-based role assignment in the dictator game
论文作者
论文摘要
大量实验的观点是，社会规范是在玩独裁者游戏（DG）的个人中出现公平性的主要因素。最近，要探索哪些社会规范有利于维持合作，已经获得了相当大的关注。但是，到目前为止，很少有研究研究社会规范如何通过间接互惠来影响公平的演变。在这项研究中，我们提出了DG的间接相互模型，并认为由于其良好的声誉，可以将个人分配为独裁者。我们通过两次计算的理论分析研究了“领先”规范和所有二阶社会规范。我们表明，当角色分配基于声誉时，“领先的八个”规范中有四个，包括严厉的判断和简单的地位，导致高水平的公平性，随着选择强度的增加。我们的工作还揭示了不仅正确的待遇，即与优秀的接收者进行公平分解，还可以区分不公正的不公平分裂与合理的不公平分裂事项，以提高公平水平。
A vast body of experiments share the view that social norms are major factors for the emergence of fairness in a population of individuals playing the dictator game (DG). Recently, to explore which social norms are conducive to sustaining cooperation has obtained considerable concern. However, thus far few studies have investigated how social norms influence the evolution of fairness by means of indirect reciprocity. In this study, we propose an indirect reciprocal model of the DG and consider that an individual can be assigned as the dictator due to its good reputation. We investigate the `leading eight' norms and all second-order social norms by a two-timescale theoretical analysis. We show that when role assignment is based on reputation, four of the `leading eight' norms, including stern judging and simple standing, lead to a high level of fairness, which increases with the selection intensity. Our work also reveals that not only the correct treatment of making a fair split with good recipients but also distinguishing unjustified unfair split from justified unfair split matters in elevating the level of fairness.
