论文标题
朝着密码认证的内存数据结构
Towards cryptographically-authenticated in-memory data structures
论文作者
论文摘要
现代处理器包括高性能加密功能，例如英特尔的AES-NI和ARM的指针身份验证，允许程序有效地验证该程序持有的数据。指针身份验证已经用于保护最近的Apple设备中的返回地址，但是到目前为止，这些结构对保护通用程序数据的用途尚未使用。 在本文中，我们展示了如何使用密码认可的数据结构来防止基于内存损坏的攻击，并展示如何使用广泛可用的硬件辅助加密机制有效地实现它们。我们对安全堆栈和队列的实现实现，其总体性能开销最少（OpenCV核心性能测试减慢速度为3.4％-6.4％），并提供了正确性的证明。
Modern processors include high-performance cryptographic functionalities such as Intel's AES-NI and ARM's Pointer Authentication that allow programs to efficiently authenticate data held by the program. Pointer Authentication is already used to protect return addresses in recent Apple devices, but as yet these structures have seen little use for the protection of general program data. In this paper, we show how cryptographically-authenticated data structures can be used to protect against attacks based on memory corruption, and show how they can be efficiently realized using widely available hardware-assisted cryptographic mechanisms. We present realizations of secure stacks and queues with minimal overall performance overhead (3.4%-6.4% slowdown of the OpenCV core performance tests), and provide proofs of correctness.
