论文标题
永远不要说永远：最佳排除和储备价格，具有基于期望的避免损失的买家
Never Say Never: Optimal Exclusion and Reserve Prices with Expectations-Based Loss-Averse Buyers
论文作者
论文摘要
当竞标者反对基于期望的损失时，我们会在具有独立私人价值的拍卖中研究储备价格。我们发现，最佳公共储备价格不包括竞标者类型的少于风险中立。此外，我们表明公共储备价格并不是最佳选择，因为卖方可以通过更好地利用``依恋效应''的机制获得更高的收入。我们讨论了两个这样的机制：i）进行分泌和随机储备价的拍卖，以及ii）两阶段机制，即如果不满足储备价格，则与公共储备价的拍卖之后进行谈判。这两种机制都使更多的竞标者对依恋效应，从而增加了投标并最终收入。
We study reserve prices in auctions with independent private values when bidders are expectations-based loss averse. We find that the optimal public reserve price excludes fewer bidder types than under risk neutrality. Moreover, we show that public reserve prices are not optimal as the seller can earn a higher revenue with mechanisms that better leverage the ``attachment effect''. We discuss two such mechanisms: i) an auction with a secrete and random reserve price, and ii) a two-stage mechanism where an auction with a public reserve price is followed by a negotiation if the reserve price is not met. Both of these mechanisms expose more bidders to the attachment effect, thereby increasing bids and ultimately revenue.
