论文标题
分销商的公共善良
Public Good Provision with a Distributor
论文作者
论文摘要
我们与分销商一起提出了公共商品供应的模型。我们的主要结果描述了一种对称的混合策略均衡，所有代理商都为带有概率$ p $的共同基金做出了贡献，并且分销商提供了一定数量的公共物品或没有。这一发现的必然是有效的公共商品供应均衡，所有代理商都会为普通基金做出贡献，所有代理人都将贡献，并且分销商为公共商品提供的整个共同基金花费了整个共同基金。
We present a model of public good provision with a distributor. Our main result describes a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, where all agents contribute to a common fund with probability $p$ and the distributor provides either a particular amount of public goods or nothing. A corollary of this finding is the efficient public good provision equilibrium where all agents contribute to the common fund, all agents are expected to contribute, and the distributor spends the entire common fund for the public good provision.
