论文标题
关于卸载量子密钥分布后处理的安全性
On the Security of Offloading Post-Processing for Quantum Key Distribution
论文作者
论文摘要
量子密钥分布（QKD）已经进行了近四十年的研究，目前正在商业应用中。但是，由于QKD的特殊性质及其物理局限性，因此大规模部署技术是具有挑战性的。除其他外，QKD在后处理阶段是计算密集的，因此设备是复杂且饥饿的，这在某些应用程序场景中导致了问题。在这项工作中，我们研究了QKD后处理堆栈中卸载计算密集型零件的可能性，以安全的方式进行不受信任的硬件。我们展示了如何将误差校正纠正以使离散可变的QKD固定到单个不信任的服务器，并且该方法不能用于长距离连续变量QKD。此外，我们分析了用于错误校正和隐私放大的多服务器协议的可能性。即使在无法将其卸载到外部服务器的情况下，能够将计算委托给设备上的不信任的硬件组件也可以改善设备制造商的成本和认证工作。
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has been researched for almost four decades and is currently making its way to commercial applications. However, deployment of the technology at scale is challenging, because of the very particular nature of QKD and its physical limitations. Among others, QKD is computationally intensive in the post-processing phase and devices are therefore complex and power hungry, which leads to problems in certain application scenarios. In this work we study the possibility to offload computationally intensive parts in the QKD post-processing stack in a secure way to untrusted hardware. We show how error correction can be securely offloaded for discrete-variable QKD to a single untrusted server and that the same method cannot be used for long distance continuous-variable QKD. Furthermore, we analyze possibilities for multi-server protocols to be used for error correction and privacy amplification. Even in cases where it is not possible to offload to an external server, being able to delegate computation to untrusted hardware components on the device could improve the cost and certification effort for device manufacturers.
