论文标题
平行比赛之间的竞争
Competition among Parallel Contests
论文作者
论文摘要
我们调查了并行举行的多个比赛的模型，每个参赛者都选择参加一场比赛，每个比赛设计师都决定奖品结构以争夺参赛者的参与。我们首先分析参赛者的战略行为，并完全表征对称贝叶斯纳什均衡。至于竞赛设计师的策略，当知道其他设计师的策略时，我们表明，计算最佳响应是NP-HARD，并提出了完全多项式时间近似方案（FPTA）来输出$ε$ - $ app的最佳响应。当其他设计师的策略尚不清楚时，我们就会为一个设计师的策略提供最坏的情况分析。我们对任何策略的实用性给出了上限，并提出了一种构建一种策略的方法，该策略可以保证在最坏情况下的上限持续比率。
We investigate the model of multiple contests held in parallel, where each contestant selects one contest to join and each contest designer decides the prize structure to compete for the participation of contestants. We first analyze the strategic behaviors of contestants and completely characterize the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium. As for the strategies of contest designers, when other designers' strategies are known, we show that computing the best response is NP-hard and propose a fully polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS) to output the $ε$-approximate best response. When other designers' strategies are unknown, we provide a worst case analysis on one designer's strategy. We give an upper bound on the utility of any strategy and propose a method to construct a strategy whose utility can guarantee a constant ratio of this upper bound in the worst case.
