论文标题
在多个互动联盟上的分布式资源分配：一种游戏理论方法
Distributed Resource Allocation over Multiple Interacting Coalitions: A Game-Theoretic Approach
论文作者
论文摘要
尽管文献中已经报道了许多分布式资源分配（DRA）算法，但仍未知如何在多个相互作用的联盟上最佳地分配资源。解决这样一个问题的一个主要挑战是，对联盟的资源分配的决定的相关性是为了他人的利益，可能会导致这些联盟之间的利益冲突。在这种情况下，在本文中制定了一种新型的多润解游戏，称为资源分配游戏，每个联盟都包含多种代理，可以合作以最大化联盟级别的利益，同时受到耦合平等所描述的资源约束。受到可变替代，梯度跟踪和领导者共识等技术的启发，分别针对每个代理商的个体益处明确取决于自身及其其他联盟中的某些代理人以及所有游戏参与者的州的某些媒介的各种益处。结果表明，所提出的算法可以线性收敛到多润滑游戏的NASH平衡（NE），同时在整个NE-Meeeking过程中满足资源约束。最后，通过数值模拟验证了当前分配算法的有效性。
Despite many distributed resource allocation (DRA) algorithms have been reported in literature, it is still unknown how to allocate the resource optimally over multiple interacting coalitions. One major challenge in solving such a problem is that, the relevance of the decision on resource allocation in a coalition to the benefit of others may lead to conflicts of interest among these coalitions. Under this context, a new type of multi-coalition game is formulated in this paper, termed as resource allocation game, where each coalition contains multiple agents that cooperate to maximize the coalition-level benefit while subject to the resource constraint described by a coupled equality. Inspired by techniques such as variable replacement, gradient tracking and leader-following consensus, two new kinds of DRA algorithms are developed respectively for the scenarios where the individual benefit of each agent explicitly depends on the states of itself and some agents in other coalitions, and on the states of all the game participants. It is shown that the proposed algorithms can converge linearly to the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the multi-coalition game while satisfying the resource constraint during the whole NE-seeking process. Finally, the validity of the present allocation algorithms is verified by numerical simulations.
