论文标题
使用税收和补贴在市场中实施公平限制
Implementing Fairness Constraints in Markets Using Taxes and Subsidies
论文作者
论文摘要
费舍尔市场是那些有预算的买家争夺稀缺物品的市场，这是许多现实世界市场的自然模型，包括在线广告。市场均衡是一组价格和分配，例如供应满足需求。我们展示了市场设计师如何在Fisher市场中使用税收或补贴，以确保市场均衡结果属于某些限制。我们展示了如何在市场设计师无法获得私人估值的在线环境中计算这些税收和补贴。我们将现有文献中提出的各种公平限制调整为市场案例，并显示谁受益并从这些限制中损失了谁，以及在多大程度上保留了市场特性在多大程度上保留了包括帕累托最优性，嫉妒和激励性的兼容性。我们发现，一些先前讨论的约束几乎没有任何保证，因为谁被他们的征收变得更好或更糟。
Fisher markets are those where buyers with budgets compete for scarce items, a natural model for many real world markets including online advertising. A market equilibrium is a set of prices and allocations of items such that supply meets demand. We show how market designers can use taxes or subsidies in Fisher markets to ensure that market equilibrium outcomes fall within certain constraints. We show how these taxes and subsidies can be computed even in an online setting where the market designer does not have access to private valuations. We adapt various types of fairness constraints proposed in existing literature to the market case and show who benefits and who loses from these constraints, as well as the extent to which properties of markets including Pareto optimality, envy-freeness, and incentive compatibility are preserved. We find that some prior discussed constraints have few guarantees in terms of who is made better or worse off by their imposition.
