论文标题
随机辅助量子标论克服探测器控制和拦截量子键分布的截距hacking
Randomized ancillary qubit overcomes detector-control and intercept-resend hacking of quantum key distribution
论文作者
论文摘要
量子密钥分布（QKD）的实际实现已被证明受到各种检测器侧通道攻击，损害了应许的无条件安全性。最值得注意的是一般的攻击类，该攻击采用了伪造的光子的使用，如检测器控制中，更广泛地是截距呈现的攻击。在本文中，我们提出了一个简单的方案来克服此类攻击：合法的用户Bob在他的网关上使用极化随机器来扭曲双向QKD配置中相位编码的光子的辅助极化。在前往他的伴侣爱丽丝的途中，一次通过随机器，然后朝相反的方向穿过，真实光子的极化量子不受随机化的影响。然而，从入侵者EVE到BOB的光子的极化状态是随机的，因此在不同路径的检测器上引导，因此它触发了警报。我们在理论上和实验上证明，使用商业现成的探测器，无论她使用哪种伪造的光线，夏娃都不可能避免触发警报。
Practical implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) have been shown to be subject to various detector side-channel attacks that compromise the promised unconditional security. Most notable is a general class of attacks adopting the use of faked-state photons as in the detector-control and, more broadly, the intercept-resend attacks. In this paper, we present a simple scheme to overcome such class of attacks: A legitimate user, Bob, uses a polarization randomizer at his gateway to distort an ancillary polarization of a phase-encoded photon in a bidirectional QKD configuration. Passing through the randomizer once on the way to his partner, Alice, and again in the opposite direction, the polarization qubit of the genuine photon is immune to randomization. However, the polarization state of a photon from an intruder, Eve, to Bob is randomized and hence directed to a detector in a different path, whereupon it triggers an alert. We demonstrate theoretically and experimentally that, using commercial off-the-shelf detectors, it can be made impossible for Eve to avoid triggering the alert, no matter what faked-state of light she uses.
