论文标题
通过运行时验证扩展攻击过失树
Extending Attack-Fault Trees with Runtime Verification
论文作者
论文摘要
自主系统通常很复杂，容易发生软件故障和网络攻击。我们介绍了RVAFT，这是一种攻击过失树（AFT）的扩展，其中包含可用于构建运行时监视器的运行时事件。这些监视器能够检测到何时发生故障，可能是由攻击或故障引起的。监控的安全性和安全属性又来自RVAFT的分层分解。我们的方法不仅提供了AFT的进一步使用，还可以改善运行时验证中经常需要的仪器过程。我们解释了原理，并提供了一个简单的案例研究，证明了如何在实践中使用RVAFT。通过此，我们还能够评估故障和攻击的检测，并评估监视器的计算开销。
Autonomous systems are often complex and prone to software failures and cyber-attacks. We introduce RVAFTs, an extension of Attack-Fault Trees (AFTs) with runtime events that can be used to construct runtime monitors. These monitors are able to detect when failures, that can be caused either by an attack or by a fault, occur. The safety and security properties monitored are, in turn, derived from the hierarchical decomposition of RVAFTs. Our approach not only provides further use of AFTs, but also improves the process of instrumentation often required in runtime verification. We explain the principles and provide a simple case study demonstrating how RVAFTs can be used in practice. Through this we are also able to evaluate the detection of faults and attacks as well as assessing the computational overhead of the monitors.
