论文标题
对高级持续威胁的防御，并具有无意或恶意的内部威胁
Defense for Advanced Persistent Threat with Inadvertent or Malicious Insider Threats
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我们提出了一个游戏理论框架，以研究两种内部人士威胁：恶意和无意的威胁。在此框架内，建立了统一的三人游戏，并根据不同的内部人士获得了纳什均衡。通过分析NASH Equilibria，我们为内幕威胁的先进持续威胁问题提供了定量解决方案。此外，已经进行了两个内部人士威胁之间的最佳防御战略和防守者的成本比较。调查结果表明，尽管恶意内部人士威胁使辩护人损失了更多，但辩护人应采取更积极的防御策略，而不是针对恶意内部人士威胁的内幕威胁。我们的理论分析通过数值结果来验证，包括对不同内部人员采用的风险策略的条件进行额外检查。这可能有助于防御者确定监测强度和防御策略。
In this paper, we propose a game-theoretical framework to investigate advanced persistent threat problems with two types of insider threats: malicious and inadvertent. Within this framework, a unified three-player game is established and Nash equilibria are obtained in response to different insiders. By analyzing Nash equilibria, we provide quantitative solutions to the advanced persistent threat problems with insider threats. Furthermore, optimal defense strategy and defender's cost comparisons between two insider threats have been performed. The findings suggest that the defender should employ more active defense strategies against inadvertent insider threats than against malicious insider threats, despite the fact that malicious insider threats cost the defender more. Our theoretical analysis is validated by numerical results, including an additional examination of the conditions of the risky strategies adopted by different insiders. This may help the defender in determining monitoring intensities and defensive strategies.
