论文标题
在模仿动态下的主导策略的生存
Survival of dominated strategies under imitation dynamics
论文作者
论文摘要
关于进化游戏理论的文献表明，严格由其他纯粹策略控制的纯策略总是在模仿游戏动态下灭绝，但它们可以在创新的动态下生存。正如我们所解释的那样，这是因为创新的动力学有利于稀有策略，而标准模仿动态则不符合稀有策略。但是，正如我们也表明的那样，有一些合理的模仿协议有利于稀有或频繁的策略，因此允许严格主导的策略在大量的模仿动态中生存。即使统治水平并不小，主导的策略也可以持续在非平凡的频率上。
The literature on evolutionary game theory suggests that pure strategies that are strictly dominated by other pure strategies always become extinct under imitative game dynamics, but they can survive under innovative dynamics. As we explain, this is because innovative dynamics favour rare strategies while standard imitative dynamics do not. However, as we also show, there are reasonable imitation protocols that favour rare or frequent strategies, thus allowing strictly dominated strategies to survive in large classes of imitation dynamics. Dominated strategies can persist at nontrivial frequencies even when the level of domination is not small.
