论文标题
针对一般攻击的广义BB84协议的合成安全性
Composable Security of Generalized BB84 Protocols Against General Attacks
论文作者
论文摘要
量子密钥分布（QKD）协议使双方有可能生成一个秘密共享密钥。 Bennett和Brassard在1984年提出了最重要的QKD协议之一BB84。已经提出了BB84无条件安全性的各种证明，但第一个安全证明并非可以组合。在这里，我们改善了由[Biham，Boyer，Boykin，Mor和Roychowdhury，J。Cryptology，19（4）：381-439，2006]给出的BB84的安全证明，可与BB84的最先进结果相匹配，我们将其扩展到了BB84的几种变体的无用安全性。我们针对BB84及其变体的合并安全性证明大多是独立的，代数和相对简单的，并且具有紧密的有限键界。
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols make it possible for two parties to generate a secret shared key. One of the most important QKD protocols, BB84, was suggested by Bennett and Brassard in 1984. Various proofs of unconditional security for BB84 have been suggested, but the first security proofs were not composable. Here we improve a security proof of BB84 given by [Biham, Boyer, Boykin, Mor, and Roychowdhury, J. Cryptology, 19(4):381-439, 2006] to be composable and match the state-of-the-art results for BB84, and we extend it to prove unconditional security of several variants of the BB84 protocol. Our composable security proof for BB84 and its variants is mostly self-contained, algebraic, and relatively simple, and it gives tight finite-key bounds.
