论文标题
分支时间中强大和弱的必需品的逻辑理论
A logical theory for strong and weak ontic necessities in branching time
论文作者
论文摘要
这种必需品是那些普遍量化的模式对````生存''''''的域而独立于我们的知识。一种称为弱的必需品的必要性引起了有趣的问题。一个例子是``我现在应该死了''。这种必要性的一个特征是它是否在某个状态下与偏见在该州是否存在无关。 ``应该''表达的认知必要性很弱吗？ ``必须''表达了强大的必要性吗？我们如何正式理解强大和弱的必需品？在本文中，我们做以下工作。首先，我们认识到强大/弱小的潜在/认知必需品，并给出有关它们的一般观念。其次，我们提出了一个完整的逻辑理论，用于分支时间中强大和弱的必需品。该理论基于以下方法。弱的必要性量化了预期时间表的域，这是由代理人的Ontic规则系统决定的。强大的必要性量化了可公开的时间表的领域，该领域由不败的Ontic规则决定。
Ontic necessities are those modalities universally quantifying over domains of ontic possibilities, whose ``existence'' is independent of our knowledge. An ontic necessity, called the weak ontic necessity, causes interesting questions. An example for it is ``I should be dead by now''. A feature of this necessity is whether it holds at a state has nothing to do with whether its prejacent holds at the state. Is there a weak epistemic necessity expressed by ``should''? Is there a strong ontic necessity expressed by ``must''? How do we make sense of the strong and weak ontic necessities formally? In this paper, we do the following work. Firstly, we recognize strong/weak ontic/epistemic necessities and give our general ideas about them. Secondly, we present a complete logical theory for the strong and weak ontic necessities in branching time. This theory is based on the following approach. The weak ontic necessity quantifies over a domain of expected timelines, determined by the agent's system of ontic rules. The strong ontic necessity quantifies over a domain of accepted timelines, determined by undefeatable ontic rules.
