论文标题
合作游戏的价值观
Gately Values of Cooperative Games
论文作者
论文摘要
我们调查了Gately的解决方案概念，用于具有可转让公用事业的合作游戏。盖特（Gately）的概念提出了一种谈判解决方案，该解决方案最大程度地量化了最大的量化``破坏''倾向''参与者在分配产生的集体收益方面的谈判过程。 Gately的解决方案概念对于一类广泛的游戏定义了。我们还基于基于参数破坏倾向的量化的概括。此外，我们研究了这些广义的Gately值与核心和核仁的关系，并表明Gately的解决方案是所有常规3播放器游戏的核心。我们确定通常这些gitaly值是任意常规合作游戏的核心归档的确切条件。最后，我们调查了Gately值与Shapley价值的关系。
We investigate Gately's solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utilities. Gately's conception introduced a bargaining solution that minimises the maximal quantified ``propensity to disrupt'' the negotiation process of the players over the allocation of the generated collective payoffs. Gately's solution concept is well-defined for a broad class of games. We also consider a generalisation based on a parameter-based quantification of the propensity to disrupt. Furthermore, we investigate the relationship of these generalised Gately values with the Core and the Nucleolus and show that Gately's solution is in the Core for all regular 3-player games. We identify exact conditions under which generally these Gately values are Core imputations for arbitrary regular cooperative games. Finally, we investigate the relationship of the Gately value with the Shapley value.
