论文标题
公平部门符合车辆路线：单调利润的驾驶员的公平性
Fair Division meets Vehicle Routing: Fairness for Drivers with Monotone Profits
论文作者
论文摘要
我们为公平划分和车辆路线提出了一个新的模型，驾驶员具有单调利润偏好，并且其车辆具有可行性的限制。对于此模型，我们为驱动程序的公平性设计了两个新的公理概念：FEQ1和FEF1。 FEQ1编码驱动程序成对有限的公平性。 FEF1编码驱动程序成对有限的嫉妒freeness。我们将FEQ1和FEF1与流行的公平部门概念（例如EQ1和EF1）进行了比较。我们还提供了分别保证FEQ1和FEF1的算法。
We propose a new model for fair division and vehicle routing, where drivers have monotone profit preferences, and their vehicles have feasibility constraints, for customer requests. For this model, we design two new axiomatic notions for fairness for drivers: FEQ1 and FEF1. FEQ1 encodes driver pairwise bounded equitability. FEF1 encodes driver pairwise bounded envy freeness. We compare FEQ1 and FEF1 with popular fair division notions such as EQ1 and EF1. We also give algorithms for guaranteeing FEQ1 and FEF1, respectively.
