论文标题
建模具有微观仿真的双面流动市场的兴衰
Modelling the Rise and Fall of Two-Sided Mobility Markets with Microsimulation
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中,我们提出了一个新颖的建模框架,以重现双面出行平台的市场进入策略。在基于MAASSIM代理的模拟器中,我们开发了一个共同进化模型,以代表双面移动市场的日常动态,代理商做出合理决策以最大程度地提高其感知的效用。代理商的参与概率取决于效用,包括:每天使用新颖的S形配方调整的经验,口口相传和营销组件 - (我们认为)比以前的方法更适合(我们认为)重现市场进入动态。有了如此丰富的代表,我们可以实际对各种市场进入策略进行建模,并创造出重大的网络效应,以重现二面移动平台的上升和下降。为了说明模型功能,我们在阿姆斯特丹的公路网络上模拟了200名驾驶员和2000名旅行者的400天演变。我们连续设计了六阶段的市场进入策略:开球,折扣,发射,增长,成熟度和贪婪阶段。 25天后,该平台提供了折扣,但仅当营销活动在第50天发起时才开始获得市场份额。50天后的活动结束,这并没有停止增长,现在主要以积极的口口相传和经验来推动。该平台在200天后结束折扣,并达到稳定的成熟期,此后其贪婪的策略导致其市场份额和利润崩溃。上面都使用单个行为模型进行了模拟,该模型很好地再现了双方的代理如何适应平台动作。
In this paper, we propose a novel modelling framework to reproduce the market entry strategies for two-sided mobility platforms. In the MaaSSim agent-based simulator, we develop a co-evolutionary model to represent day-to-day dynamics of the two-sided mobility market with agents making rational decisions to maximize their perceived utility. Participation probability of agents depends on utility, composed of: experience, word of mouth and marketing components adjusted by agents every day with the novel S-shaped formulas - better suited (in our opinion) to reproduce market entry dynamics than previous approaches. With such a rich representation, we can realistically model a variety of market entry strategies and create significant network effects to reproduce the rise and fall of two-side mobility platforms. To illustrate model capabilities, we simulate a 400-day evolution of 200 drivers and 2000 travelers on a road-network of Amsterdam. We design a six-stage market entry strategy with consecutive: kick-off, discount, launch, growth, maturity and greed stages. After 25 days the platform offers discounts, yet it starts gaining market share only when the marketing campaign launches at day 50. Campaign finishes after 50 days, which does not stop the growth, now fueled mainly with a positive word of mouth effect and experiences. The platform ends discounts after 200 days and reaches the steady maturity period, after which its greedy strategy leads to collapse of its market share and profit. All above simulated with a single behavioral model, which well reproduces how agents of both sides adapts to platform actions.