论文标题
防止策略选择机制的损失规避
Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms
论文作者
论文摘要
有证据表明，具有策略匹配机制的参与者扮演着主导的策略。为了解释数据，我们将基于期望的损失厌恶介绍到学校选择环境中，并表征选择性范围的个人平衡。我们发现，当且仅当它们是顶级单调时，非真实的偏好提交才可能是最佳的。在看似稳定或有效的机制中，可能会出现平衡，效率低下或正当的嫉妒。具体而言，比同龄人获得次优的分配的学生更厌恶或不太自信。
Evidence suggests that participants in strategy-proof matching mechanisms play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal equilibria. We find that non-truthful preference submissions can be strictly optimal if and only if they are top-rank monotone. In equilibrium, inefficiency or justified envy may arise in seemingly stable or efficient mechanisms. Specifically, students who are more loss averse or less confident than their peers obtain suboptimal allocations.
