论文标题
带有参考的位置游戏
Location games with references
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究一类位置游戏，玩家希望在外源参考位置偏离时要吸引尽可能多的资源并支付费用。这类游戏包括政策利益方与公司昂贵的水平差异之间的政治竞争。我们提供了对双重垄断竞争的完整分析：根据参考位置，我们观察到具有或没有分化或没有平衡的独特平衡。我们将分析扩展到任意数量的玩家之间的竞争，我们表明最多有一个具有强大属性的平衡：只有两个最左翼和最右翼的玩家偏离了参考地点。
We study a class of location games where players want to attract as many resources as possible and pay a cost when deviating from an exogenous reference location. This class of games includes political competitions between policy-interested parties and firms' costly horizontal differentiation. We provide a complete analysis of the duopoly competition: depending on the reference locations, we observe a unique equilibrium with, or without differentiation, or no equilibrium. We extend the analysis to a competition between an arbitrary number of players and we show that there exists at most one equilibrium which has a strong property: only the two most-left and most-right players deviate from their reference locations.
