论文标题

学术共同创作是一个冒险的游戏

Academic Co-authorship is a Risky Game

论文作者

Lazebnik, Teddy, Beck, Stephan, Shami, Labib

论文摘要

与多个参与者一起进行研究项目是一项复杂的任务,不仅涉及科学,而且还涉及多种社会,政治和心理互动。当涉及到由学术界常见的当前协作动力学形式形式而导致的稿件中,在由此产生的手稿上的合着者的数量和顺序的选择过程中,这种复杂性变得尤为明显。当前尚无计算模型来生成数据驱动的建议,该建议可以用作低估这些动态的基线。为了解决这一限制,我们开发了第一个基于游戏理论的模型,以生成这种共同作者的基线。在我们的模型中,合着者可以发出最后通stum,以暂停手稿的出版,直到解决了基本问题。我们建立了发行一个或多个最后通的效果,并表明它们对合着者的最终数量和立场和出版过程的长度产生了重大影响。此外,我们探讨了两种共同关系(学生顾问和同事 - 同事)对共同授权情景的影响。我们的模型结果令人震惊,并表明当前的学术实践不适合目的。他们在工作的地方,由于研究人员的完整性而不是系统的设计,因此他们工作的工作。

Conducting a research project with multiple participants is a complex task that involves not only scientific but also multiple social, political, and psychological interactions. This complexity becomes particularly evident when it comes to navigating the selection process for the number and order of co-authors on the resulting manuscript for publication due to the current form of collaboration dynamics common in academia. There is currently no computational model to generate a data-driven suggestion that could be used as a baseline for understating these dynamics. To address this limitation, we have developed a first game-theory-based model to generate such a baseline for co-authorship. In our model, co-authors can issued an ultimatum to pause the publication of the manuscript until the underlying issue has been resolved. We modeled the effect of issuing one or more ultimatums and showed that they have a major impact on the ultimate number and position of co-authors and the length of the publication process. In addition, we explored the effect of two common relationships (student-advisor and colleague-colleague) on co-authorship scenarios. The results of our model are alarming and suggest that the current academic practices are not fit for purpose. Where they work, they work because of the integrity of researchers and not by a systematic design.

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