论文标题
通过部分信号传导的重复非原子路由游戏中的收敛
Convergence in a Repeated Non-atomic Routing Game with Partial Signaling
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究以下重复的非原子路由游戏。在每一轮中，大自然在I.I.D.中选择一个状态。根据公开已知的分布的方式，这会影响链接延迟功能。根据公开的信号策略，系统规划师向参与代理提出了私人路线建议，该代理构成了固定的一部分。参与的代理人在上一轮的参与代理人的累积遗憾中遵守或不遵守建议。非参与者根据近视的最佳反应选择路线，对参与代理的路由决策的校准预测。我们表明，对于平行网络，如果计划者的信号策略满足服从条件，那么几乎可以肯定的是，链接流与信号传导策略引起的贝叶斯相关平衡渐近一致。
We study the following repeated non-atomic routing game. In every round, nature chooses a state in an i.i.d. manner according to a publicly known distribution, which influences link latency functions. The system planner makes private route recommendations to participating agents, which constitute a fixed fraction, according to a publicly known signaling strategy. The participating agents choose between obeying or not obeying the recommendation according to cumulative regret of the participating agent population in the previous round. The non-participating agents choose route according to myopic best response to a calibrated forecast of the routing decisions of the participating agents. We show that, for parallel networks, if the planner's signal strategy satisfies the obedience condition, then, almost surely, the link flows are asymptotically consistent with the Bayes correlated equilibrium induced by the signaling strategy.
