论文标题
眨眼：拒绝安全消息传递
Wink: Deniable Secure Messaging
论文作者
论文摘要
端到端加密（E2EE）消息传递是提供消息机密性的重要第一步。不幸的是，当钥匙或明文被披露时，由于设备的妥协或（有时是合法的）强大对手的胁迫，所有端到端加密的安全保证都会丢失。这项工作介绍了Wink，这是第一个可行的必需消息系统，该系统可保护消息机密性免受部分设备的妥协并迫使密钥披露。 Wink可以秘密地将隐藏的消息注入标准的随机硬币（例如，盐，IVS），现有E2EE协议使用。它是在广泛可信赖的执行环境（TEE）Trustzone中部署的合法安全加密功能的一部分。这导致隐藏的通信使用实际上不变的现有E2EE消息传递应用程序以及强大的合理可否认性。 Wink已通过多个现有的E2EE应用程序（包括电报和信号）证明了最小（外部）仪器，可忽略不计的开销以及至关重要的，而无需更改连接消息格式。
End-to-end encrypted (E2EE) messaging is an essential first step in providing message confidentiality. Unfortunately, all security guarantees of end-to-end encryption are lost when keys or plaintext are disclosed, either due to device compromise or (sometimes lawful) coercion by powerful adversaries. This work introduces Wink, the first plausibly-deniable messaging system protecting message confidentiality from partial device compromise and compelled key disclosure. Wink can surreptitiously inject hidden messages in standard random coins (e.g., salts, IVs) used by existing E2EE protocols. It does so as part of legitimate secure cryptographic functionality deployed inside the widely-available trusted execution environment (TEE) TrustZone. This results in hidden communication using virtually unchanged existing E2EE messaging apps, as well as strong plausible deniability. Wink has been demonstrated with multiple existing E2EE applications (including Telegram and Signal) with minimal (external) instrumentation, negligible overheads, and crucially, without changing on-wire message formats.
