论文标题
在短暂的回忆下的声誉效果
Reputation Effects under Short Memories
论文作者
论文摘要
我分析了患者卖方和一系列近视消费者之间的新声誉游戏，其中消费者的记忆力有限，并且不知道卖方行动的确切顺序。我专注于每个消费者仅观察卖方在最后K时期采取其每个行为的次数的情况。当收益是单调的，我表明，只要k至少一个，病人的卖方就可以在所有均衡中确保他的承诺收益。我还表明，当且仅当他们的记忆长度K低于某些截止时，消费者就可以在所有均衡中大致达到他们在所有均衡中的第一最好福利。尽管较长的记忆使更多的消费者一旦卖方推荐就可以惩罚卖方，但一旦卖方观察到他逃避了卖方，它就会削弱他们的激励措施
I analyze a novel reputation game between a patient seller and a sequence of myopic consumers, in which the consumers have limited memories and do not know the exact sequence of the seller's actions. I focus on the case where each consumer only observes the number of times that the seller took each of his actions in the last K periods. When payoffs are monotone-supermodular, I show that the patient seller can approximately secure his commitment payoff in all equilibria as long as K is at least one. I also show that the consumers can approximately attain their first-best welfare in all equilibria if and only if their memory length K is lower than some cutoff. Although a longer memory enables more consumers to punish the seller once the seller shirks, it weakens their incentives to punish the seller once they observe him shirking
