论文标题
赢家全力困境
The Winner-Take-All Dilemma
论文作者
论文摘要
当社会由赋予投票权重的团体组成时，我们考虑集体决策。每个小组都选择一个内部规则，该规则指定其权重与替代方案的分配，这是其成员偏好的函数。在相当普遍的条件下，我们表明，赢家接纳的规则是一个主要的策略，而平衡占主导地位，强调了每个群体和整个社会的最优性之间的困境结构。我们还开发了一种用于渐近分析的技术，并显示了比例规则的帕累托优势。我们对美国选举学院的数值计算验证了其敏感性。
We consider collective decision making when the society consists of groups endowed with voting weights. Each group chooses an internal rule that specifies the allocation of its weight to the alternatives as a function of its members' preferences. Under fairly general conditions, we show that the winner-take-all rule is a dominant strategy, while the equilibrium is Pareto dominated, highlighting the dilemma structure between optimality for each group and for the whole society. We also develop a technique for asymptotic analysis and show Pareto dominance of the proportional rule. Our numerical computation for the US Electoral College verifies its sensibility.
