论文标题

您是您自己的论文的最佳审阅者:同学机制

You Are the Best Reviewer of Your Own Papers: The Isotonic Mechanism

论文作者

Su, Weijie

论文摘要

近年来,机器学习(ML)和人工智能(AI)会议的同行评审质量显着下降。为了应对这一日益增长的挑战,我们介绍了等渗机制,这是一种计算有效的方法,可以通过纳入作者对其提交的私人评估来提高嘈杂评论分数的准确性。在这种机制下,需要多个提交的作者必须按照感知质量的降序对论文进行排名。随后,根据此排名,对原始审查分数进行校准,以产生调整后的分数。我们证明作者被激励以真实地报告其排名,因为这样做可以最大程度地提高其预期的实用程序,并在调整后的分数上以添加剂凸功能为模型。此外,调整后的分数比原始分数更准确,当噪声水平高并且作者有许多提交时,改善尤其重要 - 在大规模ML/AI会议上,这种情况越来越普遍。 我们进一步研究提交质量信息是否可以如实地从作者那里汲取。我们确定真实引起的必要条件是该机制基于作者提交的成对比较。该结果强调了等渗机制的最佳性,因为它在我们考虑的所有机制中都引起了最细粒度的真实信息。然后,我们提出了几个扩展,包括证明该机制仍保持真实性,即使作者只有部分而不是有关其提交质量的完整信息。最后,我们讨论了未来的研究方向,重点是对机制的实际实施以及受我们机制启发的理论框架的进一步发展。

Machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI) conferences including NeurIPS and ICML have experienced a significant decline in peer review quality in recent years. To address this growing challenge, we introduce the Isotonic Mechanism, a computationally efficient approach to enhancing the accuracy of noisy review scores by incorporating authors' private assessments of their submissions. Under this mechanism, authors with multiple submissions are required to rank their papers in descending order of perceived quality. Subsequently, the raw review scores are calibrated based on this ranking to produce adjusted scores. We prove that authors are incentivized to truthfully report their rankings because doing so maximizes their expected utility, modeled as an additive convex function over the adjusted scores. Moreover, the adjusted scores are shown to be more accurate than the raw scores, with improvements being particularly significant when the noise level is high and the author has many submissions -- a scenario increasingly prevalent at large-scale ML/AI conferences. We further investigate whether submission quality information beyond a simple ranking can be truthfully elicited from authors. We establish that a necessary condition for truthful elicitation is that the mechanism be based on pairwise comparisons of the author's submissions. This result underscores the optimality of the Isotonic Mechanism, as it elicits the most fine-grained truthful information among all mechanisms we consider. We then present several extensions, including a demonstration that the mechanism maintains truthfulness even when authors have only partial rather than complete information about their submission quality. Finally, we discuss future research directions, focusing on the practical implementation of the mechanism and the further development of a theoretical framework inspired by our mechanism.

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