论文标题
在线图上不对称，非合作游戏的广义NASH平衡模型：水资源系统的应用
Generalized Nash Equilibrium Models for Asymmetric, Non-cooperative Games on Line Graphs: Application to Water Resource Systems
论文作者
论文摘要
本文调查了资源分配情况的游戏理论，在这些理论中，“首先出现，首次服用”启发式启发会对玩家产生不平等，不对称的好处。具体而言，此问题被公平化为纳什均衡模型，其中玩家沿有向线图顺序排列。该模型的目的是使用政策工具减少玩家之间的不对称益处。它是对合作游戏理论文献中考虑的线条模型的一种更现实的替代方法。还为水资源系统开发了面向应用程序的配方。该模型中的玩家是撤出水的公用事业，并沿着河流从上游到下游安排。该模型应用于美国田纳西州鸭河盆地的风格化三节点模型以及测试床。根据结果，根据合作游戏理论中传统上使用的指标，非合件，释放市场可以是可接受的政策工具
This paper investigates the game theory of resource-allocation situations where the "first come, first serve" heuristic creates inequitable, asymmetric benefits to the players. Specifically, this problem is formulated as a Generalized Nash Equilibrium Model where the players are arranged sequentially along a directed line graph. The goal of the model is to reduce the asymmetric benefits among the players using a policy instrument. It serves as a more realistic, alternative approach to the line-graph models considered in the cooperative game-theoretic literature. An application-oriented formulation is also developed for water resource systems. The players in this model are utilities who withdraw water and are arranged along a river basin from upstream to downstream. This model is applied to a stylized, three-node model as well as a test bed in the Duck River Basin in Tennessee, USA. Based on the results, a non-cooperative, water-release market can be an acceptable policy instrument according to metrics traditionally used in cooperative game theory
