论文标题

基于凸组合攻击的设备无关量子密钥分布的关键速率上限

Upper bounds on key rates in device-independent quantum key distribution based on convex-combination attacks

论文作者

Łukanowski, Karol, Balanzó-Juandó, Maria, Farkas, Máté, Acín, Antonio, Kołodyński, Jan

论文摘要

独立于设备的框架构成了对量子协议的最务实方法,该方法不会对其实现进行任何信任。它需要所有索赔,例如安全性,可以在最终用户手中的最终经典数据级别进行。这对确定与设备无关的量子密钥分布(DIQKD)的可达到的关键率构成了巨大的挑战,但也为考虑窃听攻击而打开了大门,这些攻击源于刚刚由恶意第三方产生的给定数据的可能性。在这项工作中,我们探讨了这条道路,并介绍了凸组合攻击,作为一种高效,易于使用的技术,适用于大型DIQKD关键率。它允许验证最先进协议的关键率的下限的准确性,无论是涉及单向还是双向通信。特别是,我们在其帮助下证明了当前对DIQKD方案对实验缺陷的鲁棒性的约束,例如有限的可见性或检测效率,已经非常接近最终的可容忍阈值。

The device-independent framework constitutes the most pragmatic approach to quantum protocols that does not put any trust in their implementations. It requires all claims, about e.g. security, to be made at the level of the final classical data in hands of the end-users. This imposes a great challenge for determining attainable key rates in device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD), but also opens the door for consideration of eavesdropping attacks that stem from the possibility of a given data being just generated by a malicious third-party. In this work, we explore this path and present the convex-combination attack as an efficient, easy-to-use technique for upper-bounding DIQKD key rates. It allows verifying the accuracy of lower bounds on key rates for state-of-the-art protocols, whether involving one-way or two-way communication. In particular, we demonstrate with its help that the currently predicted constraints on the robustness of DIQKD protocols to experimental imperfections, such as the finite visibility or detection efficiency, are already very close to the ultimate tolerable thresholds.

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