论文标题
可靠的平衡
Credible equilibrium
论文作者
论文摘要
可靠的平衡是一个解决方案概念，它比子游戏均衡均衡提出了更强的信誉概念。可靠的平衡是子游戏的完美平衡的改进，因此，如果子游戏中G中的威胁是“可信的”，那么它也必须在每个“等效”的子游戏中可信。我表明（i）在多阶段游戏中存在一个可靠的平衡，并且（ii）如果每个舞台游戏都具有唯一的NASH平衡，那么即使在无限的地平线多阶段游戏中，可信的平衡也是独一无二的。此外，在完美的信息游戏中，可靠的平衡相当于子游戏的完美平衡。
Credible equilibrium is a solution concept that imposes a stronger credibility notion than subgame perfect equilibrium. A credible equilibrium is a refinement of subgame perfect equilibrium such that if a threat in a subgame g is "credible," then it must also be credible in every subgame g' that is "equivalent" to g. I show that (i) a credible equilibrium exists in multi-stage games, and (ii) if every stage game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then the credible equilibrium is unique even in infinite horizon multi-stage games. Moreover, in perfect information games, credible equilibrium is equivalent to subgame perfect equilibrium.
