论文标题
交易收益到扩大的社区？进化游戏理论的新证据
Trading Payoffs to Enlarged Neighborhoods? A New Evidence from Evolutionary Game Theory
论文作者
论文摘要
人口多样性是囚犯困境游戏（PDG）研究的重要方面。但是，关于动态多样性及其相关成本的研究仍需要进一步研究。基于一个包括二维空间进化PDG的框架，这项工作通过使每个玩家能够为附近的升级付费从冯·诺伊曼（Von Neumann）转移到摩尔社区，从而研究了玩家社区的变化。升级成本（即高级社区的成本）在合作促销中起着至关重要的作用，并且是屏幕玩家的入门级。结果表明，合理的价格（入门级）支持了合作者在难度高的环境中的生存，因为它允许形成“正常的边缘优势核心”群集。在低入门级方面，如果所有球员都可以使用较大的社区，那么拥有较大社区的特权就可以支持合作。在较高的入门级侧，优势缺陷的包围出现在合作集群中。为了打破包围并启用优势群集的扩展，应增加入门级以中断优势缺陷。只能在确定性模型中观察到包围。随机模拟作为稳健性基准提供。
Population diversity is an important aspect of Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG) research. However, the studies on dynamic diversity and its associated cost still need further investigation. Based on a framework comprising 2-dimensional spatial evolutionary PDG, this work examines the change in a player's neighborhood by enabling each player to pay for an upgrade of their neighborhood to switch from the von Neumann to Moore neighborhood. The upgrade cost (i.e., the cost of the advanced neighborhood) plays a vital role in cooperation promotion and serves as an entry-level to screen players. The results show that a reasonable price (entry-level) supports the cooperators' survival in an environment with high dilemma strength since it allows the formation of "normal-edge-advantage-core" clusters. On the low entry-level side, the privilege of having a larger neighborhood supports cooperation if it is accessible to all the players. On the high entry-level side, encirclements of advantage defectors appear out of the cooperative clusters. To break the encirclement and enable the expansion of the advantage clusters, the entry-level should be increased to interrupt the advantage defectors. The encirclement can be observed only in the deterministic models. Stochastic simulations are provided as robustness benchmarks.
