论文标题
自动做市商的经济学
The Economics of Automated Market Makers
论文作者
论文摘要
本文研究了一个问题，例如UNISWAP之类的自动做市商协议是否可以可持续保留其部分交易费用。我们通过建模如何最佳选择池的接收率来解决问题，即与协议保留的费用收入的一部分，以最大程度地提高协议的收入。该模型表明，如果AMM具有忠诚贸易量的一部分，他们可以可持续设定非零的承担率，即使不会失去零承担率的竞争对手流动性。此外，我们根据许多模型参数确定最佳的收入率，包括忠诚贸易量池拥有多少以及竞争对手的收入率有多少。
This paper studies the question whether automated market maker protocols such as Uniswap can sustainably retain a portion of their trading fees for the protocol. We approach the problem by modelling how to optimally choose a pool's take rate, i.e\ the fraction of fee revenue that remains with the protocol, in order to maximize the protocol's revenue. The model suggest that if AMMs have a portion of loyal trade volume, they can sustainably set a non-zero take rate, even without losing liquidity to competitors with a zero take rate. Furthermore, we determine the optimal take rate depending on a number of model parameters including how much loyal trade volume pools have and how high the competitors' take rates are.
