论文标题
Web3符合行为经济学：盈利加密彩票机制设计的示例
Web3 Meets Behavioral Economics: An Example of Profitable Crypto Lottery Mechanism Design
论文作者
论文摘要
在Web3时代，我们经常面临设计激励机制的非平凡任务。正如历史所示，许多Web3服务主要是由于缺乏基于代币经济学的严格激励机制设计。但是，传统的机制设计是有一个假设，即服务用户在战略上做出决策，以便最大化他们的预期利润，通常不会很好地捕捉他们的真实行为，因为它忽略了人类在不确定性下做出决策时的心理偏见。在本文中，我们提出了一种使用行为经济学支持加密服务的激励机制设计。具体来说，我们以这项工作中的加密彩票游戏为例，并将累积前景理论的开创性作品纳入其彩票游戏机制（或规则）设计中。我们设计了四种机制，并用实用程序进行了比较，这是一种机制对参与者的吸引力以及游戏运营商的预期利润的指标。我们的方法是通用的，它将适用于广泛的基于加密的服务，在不确定性下必须做出决定。
We are often faced with the non-trivial task of designing incentive mechanisms in the era of Web3. As history has shown, many Web3 services failed mostly due to the lack of a rigorous incentive mechanism design based on token economics. However, traditional mechanism design, where there is an assumption that the users of services strategically make decisions so that their expected profits are maximized, often does not capture their real behavior well as it ignores humans' psychological bias in making decisions under uncertainty. In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism design for crypto-enabled services using behavioral economics. Specifically, we take an example of a crypto lottery game in this work and incorporate a seminal work of cumulative prospect theory into its lottery game mechanism (or rule) design. We designed four mechanisms and compared them in terms of utility, a metric of how appealing a mechanism is to participants, and a game operator's expected profit. Our approach is generic and will be applicable to a wide range of crypto-based services where a decision has to be made under uncertainty.
