论文标题
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Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for all Distributions
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑将收入最大化的卖家，将单个物品出售给I.I.D的多个买家。估值。 Akbarpour和Li（2020）表明，唯一的最佳，可信，策略性的拍卖是带有无限沟通复杂性的储备金的上升价格拍卖。 Ferreira和Weinberg（2020）的最新工作避免了其不可能的结果，假设存在密码安全的承诺方案，并设计了两轮可信，策略性的，最佳的，最佳的拍卖。但是，只有当买方的估值为MHR或$α$ - 杂乱无章的情况下，他们的拍卖才是可信的：即使是从非MHR分布中获取单个买家，他们的拍卖也可能是不可信的。在这项工作中，在相同的加密假设下，我们确定了一项新的单项拍卖，该拍卖是可靠，防止策略，收入最佳的，并且在不断终止的所有分布中都以有限的垄断价格终止。
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with a single item for sale to multiple buyers with i.i.d. valuations. Akbarpour and Li (2020) show that the only optimal, credible, strategyproof auction is the ascending price auction with reserves which has unbounded communication complexity. Recent work of Ferreira and Weinberg (2020) circumvents their impossibility result assuming the existence of cryptographically secure commitment schemes, and designs a two-round credible, strategyproof, optimal auction. However, their auction is only credible when buyers' valuations are MHR or $α$-strongly regular: they show their auction might not be credible even when there is a single buyer drawn from a non-MHR distribution. In this work, under the same cryptographic assumptions, we identify a new single-item auction that is credible, strategyproof, revenue optimal, and terminates in constant rounds in expectation for all distributions with finite monopoly price.
