论文标题
动态机制的信息设计
Information Design of Dynamic Mechanisms
论文作者
论文摘要
如果两种动态游戏形式在行为上相当于它们的“相同”结构减少策略的“相同”概况（Battigalli等，2020）。在动态实施的背景下，在广泛的解决方案概念下，以行为等效的游戏形式可以互换，以实现社会选择功能。一种渐进的机制（Chew and Wang，2022）设计了由中央管理员介导的信息传输过程，可以正式定义信息流。我们提供了渐进机制在其信息等效性方面的行为等效性的表征 - 每个代理都设计了“相同”的信息流。信息流还有助于定义直觉的直觉概念，即逐步机制，这等同于它们的游戏结构最小。鉴于一类渐进机制是动态实施的启示原则（Li，2017; Akbarpour and Li，2020; Mackenzie，2020; Chew and Wang，2022），一系列即时的渐进机制提供了精致的启示原理。
Two dynamic game forms are said to be behaviorally equivalent if they share the "same" profiles of structurally reduced strategies (Battigalli et al., 2020). In the context of dynamic implementation, behaviorally equivalent game forms are interchangeable under a wide range of solution concepts for the purpose of implementing a social choice function. A gradual mechanism (Chew and Wang, 2022), which designs a procedure of information transmission mediated by a central administrator, enables a formal definition of information flow. We provide a characterization of behavioral equivalence between gradual mechanisms in terms of their informational equivalence -- each agent is designed the "same" information flow. Information flow also helps in defining an intuitive notion of immediacy for gradual mechanisms which is equivalent to their game structures being minimal. Given that the class of gradual mechanisms serves as a revelation principle for dynamic implementation (Li, 2017; Akbarpour and Li, 2020; Mackenzie, 2020; Chew and Wang, 2022), the class of immediate gradual mechanisms provides a refined revelation principle.
