论文标题
错误的安全感?重新访问基于机器学习的工业入侵检测状态
A False Sense of Security? Revisiting the State of Machine Learning-Based Industrial Intrusion Detection
论文作者
论文摘要
基于异常的入侵检测有望通过对预期系统行为进行建模并提高任何偏差的相应警报来检测对工业控制系统的新颖或未知攻击。在手动创建这些行为模型时,这些行为模型乏味且容易出错,研究重点是机器学习来自动训练它们,从而实现高达99%的检测率。但是,这些方法通常不仅接受良性流量的培训,而且对攻击进行了培训,然后对用于训练的相同攻击进行了评估。因此,他们对未知(未经训练)攻击的实际,现实世界的表现尚不清楚。反过来,报告的基于机器学习的入侵检测的接近完美检测率可能会产生错误的安全感。为了评估这种情况并阐明基于机器学习的工业入侵检测的真正潜力,我们开发了一种评估方法,并研究了文献中的多种方法,以表现出其在未知攻击方面的表现(不包括培训)。我们的结果突出了检测未知攻击的无效性,对于某些类型的攻击,检测率下降到3.2%至14.7%。展望未来,我们提出了有关基于机器学习的方法的进一步研究的建议,以确保其检测未知攻击的能力。
Anomaly-based intrusion detection promises to detect novel or unknown attacks on industrial control systems by modeling expected system behavior and raising corresponding alarms for any deviations.As manually creating these behavioral models is tedious and error-prone, research focuses on machine learning to train them automatically, achieving detection rates upwards of 99%. However, these approaches are typically trained not only on benign traffic but also on attacks and then evaluated against the same type of attack used for training. Hence, their actual, real-world performance on unknown (not trained on) attacks remains unclear. In turn, the reported near-perfect detection rates of machine learning-based intrusion detection might create a false sense of security. To assess this situation and clarify the real potential of machine learning-based industrial intrusion detection, we develop an evaluation methodology and examine multiple approaches from literature for their performance on unknown attacks (excluded from training). Our results highlight an ineffectiveness in detecting unknown attacks, with detection rates dropping to between 3.2% and 14.7% for some types of attacks. Moving forward, we derive recommendations for further research on machine learning-based approaches to ensure clarity on their ability to detect unknown attacks.