论文标题
影响两极分化的立法机关
Influencing a Polarized and Connected Legislature
论文作者
论文摘要
兴趣集团什么时候可以利用政党之间的两极分化来利用其优势？在Battaglini和Patacchini（2018）的基础上，我们研究了一个模型，其中一个利益集团可靠地承诺向立法者支付以投票支持其首选政策。立法者可以直接容易受到其他立法者的影响，并像他们这样的投票。立法者间敏感性的总体模式决定了各个立法者的相对影响，因此决定了当事方的相对影响。我们表明，当政党在意识形态上与利益群体保持一致时，高水平的意识形态或情感极化更有可能受益。但是，意识形态和情感极化以不同的方式运行。立法者的影响独立于意识形态两极分化。相反，情感两极分化有效地在各方的立法者之间建立了负面联系，从而改变了各个立法者和当事方的相对影响。
When can an interest group exploit polarization between political parties to its advantage? Building upon Battaglini and Patacchini (2018), we study a model where an interest group credibly promises payments to legislators conditional on voting for its preferred policy. A legislator can be directly susceptible to other legislators and value voting like them. The overall pattern of inter-legislator susceptibility determines the relative influence of individual legislators, and therefore the relative influence of the parties. We show that high levels of ideological or affective polarization are more likely to benefit the interest group when the party ideologically aligned with the interest group is relatively more influential. However, ideological and affective polarization operate in different ways. The influence of legislators is independent of ideological polarization. In contrast, affective polarization effectively creates negative links between legislators across parties, and thus modifies the relative influence of individual legislators and parties.
