论文标题
区块链对等网络的战略延迟减少
Strategic Latency Reduction in Blockchain Peer-to-Peer Networks
论文作者
论文摘要
大多数无许可的区块链网络都在点对点（P2P）网络上运行，这些网络提供了灵活性和权力下放，但以性能为代价（例如，网络延迟）。从历史上看，对于大多数区块链来说，这种权衡并不是瓶颈。但是，新兴的基于区块链的应用程序（例如，分散的财务）对延迟越来越敏感。相对于其他用户可以减少网络延迟的用户可以（有时是重要的）财务收益。在这项工作中，我们启动了区块链P2P网络中战略潜伏期减少的研究。我们首先定义了两类在区块链应用中感兴趣的延迟类别。然后，我们从经验上表明，只能控制本地对焦决策的战略代理可以操纵两种类型的延迟，从而获得集中式付费服务BloxRoute提供的全球延迟收益的60％，或者在有针对性的情况下，可比的收益可比。最后，我们表明我们的结果并不是由于现有P2P网络的设计不佳。在简单的网络模型下，我们从理论上证明，如果网络体验足够的同行流失和交易活动，那么对手总是可以操纵P2P网络的潜伏期。
Most permissionless blockchain networks run on peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, which offer flexibility and decentralization at the expense of performance (e.g., network latency). Historically, this tradeoff has not been a bottleneck for most blockchains. However, an emerging host of blockchain-based applications (e.g., decentralized finance) are increasingly sensitive to latency; users who can reduce their network latency relative to other users can accrue (sometimes significant) financial gains. In this work, we initiate the study of strategic latency reduction in blockchain P2P networks. We first define two classes of latency that are of interest in blockchain applications. We then show empirically that a strategic agent who controls only their local peering decisions can manipulate both types of latency, achieving 60\% of the global latency gains provided by the centralized, paid service bloXroute, or, in targeted scenarios, comparable gains. Finally, we show that our results are not due to the poor design of existing P2P networks. Under a simple network model, we theoretically prove that an adversary can always manipulate the P2P network's latency to their advantage, provided the network experiences sufficient peer churn and transaction activity.
