论文标题
有限承诺的限制
The Limits of Limited Commitment
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究有限的战略领导力。涵盖领导者行动空间的子集的集合决定了她的承诺机会。我们表征了此类承诺结构所产生的结果。如果承诺结构是一个间隔分区，那么领导者的回报将受她的Stackelberg和Cournot的回报。根据一般承诺结构，领导者可能会获得比她最低的库诺特回报的回报。我们将结果应用于教科书的双重垄断模型，并引起了导致消费者和生产者最佳成果的承诺结构。
We study limited strategic leadership. A collection of subsets covering the leader's action space determines her commitment opportunities. We characterize the outcomes resulting from all possible commitment structures of this kind. If the commitment structure is an interval partition, then the leader's payoff is bounded by her Stackelberg and Cournot payoffs. Under general commitment structures the leader may obtain a payoff that is less than her lowest Cournot payoff. We apply our results to a textbook duopoly model and elicit the commitment structures leading to consumer- and producer-optimal outcomes.
