论文标题
轨道使用管理方面的国际合作与竞争
International cooperation and competition in orbit-use management
论文作者
论文摘要
可以将轨道使用的管理努力构成具有约束力的国家监管政策或自我管理国际条约。在不久的将来，控制空间碎片生长的新条约似乎不太可能。太空国家可以采取国家监管政策，尽管监管竞争和开放式轨道通道使其有效性不清楚。在面对开放访问，监管竞争和灾难的情况下，我们制定了国家监管政策和自我管理国际条约的游戏理论模型。公开通道限制了国家政策的有效性，但市场访问控制确保了政策可以提高环境质量。大量的遗产碎片可确保存在全球监管平衡，所有国家都选择对所有卫星征收环境法规。全球监管平衡支持了一项自我执行条约，以使其离开条约和自由骑行成本更高，以避免灾难。
Orbit-use management efforts can be structured as binding national regulatory policies or as self-enforcing international treaties. New treaties to control space debris growth appear unlikely in the near future. Spacefaring nations can pursue national regulatory policies, though regulatory competition and open access to orbit make their effectiveness unclear. We develop a game-theoretic model of national regulatory policies and self-enforcing international treaties for orbit-use management in the face of open access, regulatory competition, and catastrophe. While open access limits the effectiveness of national policies, market-access control ensures the policies can improve environmental quality. A large enough stock of legacy debris ensures existence of a global regulatory equilibrium where all nations choose to levy environmental regulations on all satellites. The global regulatory equilibrium supports a self-enforcing treaty to avert catastrophe by making it costlier to leave the treaty and free ride.
