论文标题
可信说服
Credible Persuasion
论文作者
论文摘要
我们提出了贝叶斯说服问题的新概念。如果发件人无法从篡改她的消息中获利，同时保持消息分发不变，则披露政策是可信的。我们表明，披露政策的可信度等于其对国家和行动的诱导分布的周期性单调性条件。我们还表征了信誉如何限制发件人在不同的回报结构下说服的能力。特别是，当发件人的收益是与州无关的时，所有披露政策都是可信的。我们将结果应用于柠檬市场，并表明卖方无法可靠地披露有用的信息，即使可以承诺她的披露政策的卖方可以完美地揭示她的私人信息以最大程度地提高利润。
We propose a new notion of credibility for Bayesian persuasion problems. A disclosure policy is credible if the sender cannot profit from tampering with her messages while keeping the message distribution unchanged. We show that the credibility of a disclosure policy is equivalent to a cyclical monotonicity condition on its induced distribution over states and actions. We also characterize how credibility restricts the Sender's ability to persuade under different payoff structures. In particular, when the sender's payoff is state-independent, all disclosure policies are credible. We apply our results to the market for lemons, and show that no useful information can be credibly disclosed by the seller, even though a seller who can commit to her disclosure policy would perfectly reveal her private information to maximize profit.
