论文标题
背景下的战略行为未对准
Strategic Behavior under Context Misalignment
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了理性的行为含义和对理性（RCSBR）的共同信念（RCSBR），具有上下文的假设，使玩家能够娱乐不一致的信念，即玩家可以坚持对对手信仰的信念，而没有对手持有那些非常信仰的对手。从分析师的角度来看，我们通过引入分离类型结构的概念来区分玩家（“真实类型”）实际持有的信念（“真实类型”）的无限层次结构。我们表征了RCSBR对所有分离类型结构的真实类型的行为含义，这是通过完整强大的最佳基集Battigalli＆Friedenberg（2012）的一组子集的家族（2012）。通过允许错位，在动态游戏中，我们可以获得与RCSBR（在标准框架中）不一致的行为预测，这与基于信念的静态游戏分析的情况相反，由于二分法“非单调性与单调”的差异。
We study the behavioral implications of Rationality and Common Strong Belief in Rationality (RCSBR) with contextual assumptions allowing players to entertain misaligned beliefs, i.e., players can hold beliefs concerning their opponents' beliefs where there is no opponent holding those very beliefs. Taking the analysts' perspective, we distinguish the infinite hierarchies of beliefs actually held by players ("real types") from those that are a byproduct of players' hierarchies ("imaginary types") by introducing the notion of separating type structure. We characterize the behavioral implications of RCSBR for the real types across all separating type structures via a family of subsets of Full Strong Best-Reply Sets of Battigalli & Friedenberg (2012). By allowing misalignment, in dynamic games we can obtain behavioral predictions inconsistent with RCSBR (in the standard framework), contrary to the case of belief-based analyses for static games--a difference due to the dichotomy "non-monotonic vs. monotonic" reasoning.
