论文标题
一种新的安全指导设计方法，以补充基于模型的安全性分析以进行安全保证
A new safety-guided design methodology to complement model-based safety analysis for safety assurance
论文作者
论文摘要
随着正式方法的快速发展，基于模型的安全分析（MBSA）因其严格验证安全性至关重要的情况是否通过网络物理人类系统的设计解决方案充分解决了严格验证是否充分解决了安全 - 关键方案的能力。但是，存在差距。如果首先在给定的设计解决方案（即模型）中不包括特定的安全 - 关键方案，则不能相信MBSA的结果以确保安全性。为了解决这个问题，我们提出了一种新的安全指导设计方法（称为STPA+），以补充MBSA。受STPA的启发，STPA+将系统视为控制结构，该系统特别适合在人，机器和自动化之间进行复杂相互作用的系统。在STPA+中开发了三种方法，以解决由错误定义的安全限制，不当约束的过程模型以及设计不足的控制器引起的安全关键方案的可能遗漏。通过这种方式，STPA+直接得出了适当定义的设计解决方案，作为MBSA验证程序的输入，并弥合了当前MBSA方法和安全保证之间的差距。
With the rapid advancement of Formal Methods, Model-based Safety Analysis (MBSA) has been gaining tremendous attention for its ability to rigorously verify whether the safety-critical scenarios are adequately addressed by the design solution of a cyber-physical human system. However, there is a gap. If specific safety-critical scenarios are not included in the given design solution (i.e., the model) in the first place, the results of MBSA cannot be trusted for safety assurance. To tackle this problem, we propose a new safety-guided design methodology (called STPA+) to complement MBSA. Inspired by STPA, STPA+ treats a system as a control structure, which is particularly fit for systems with complex interactions between human, machine, and automation. Three methods are developed in STPA+ to tackle the possible omissions of safety-critical scenarios caused by incorrectly defined safety constraints, improperly constrained process model, and inadequately designed controller. In this way, STPA+ directly derives an adequately defined design solution as the input to an MBSA verification program and bridges the gap between current MBSA approaches and safety assurance.
