论文标题
使用KARL从供应商基础设施中解脱IoT设备
Extricating IoT Devices from Vendor Infrastructure with Karl
论文作者
论文摘要
大多数消费者IoT设备都与云端基础架构垂直集成。这些体系结构给用户数据带来了巨大的风险，这会因供应商异质性而加剧，并且无法审核云端活动。一种更有希望的方法是利用本地硬件，使用户控制其数据的处理方式以及为什么可以与其他设备或Internet共享其数据。 Karl是一个新的智能家庭框架，旨在在用户选择的设备上托管物联网计算和存储。 Karl模块化编程模型中的一个关键见解是，在单个框架下，熟悉的界面（受服务器的启发）可以捕获大多数现代云侧的物联网组件，该框架执行了硬件位置的模块。在本地托管消除了许多流程的同时，模块化使所有剩余的流都可以使用细粒度的原始素来证明所有流量。我们介绍了两种IoT安全机制：允许设备数据共享的管道权限，除非满足特定条件，否则可以将设备数据共享。我们通过两个端到端的应用程序评估Karl。
Most consumer IoT devices are vertically integrated with cloud-side infrastructure. Such architectures present enormous risk to user data, exacerbated by vendor heterogeneity and the inability for users to audit cloud-side activity. A more promising approach would be to leverage local hardware, providing users control over how their data is processed and why it can be shared with other devices or the Internet. Karl is a new smart-home framework designed to host IoT computation and storage on user-chosen devices. A key insight in Karl's modular programming model is that a familiar interface (inspired by serverless) can capture most modern cloud-side IoT components under a single framework, which executes modules agnostic of hardware location. While local hosting eliminates many flows, modularity enables all remaining flows to be justified using fine-grained primitives. We introduce two IoT security mechanisms: pipeline permissions that permit device data to be shared given some justification and exit policies that block flows unless specific conditions are met. We evaluate Karl through two end-to-end applications.
