论文标题
从预测市场到可解释的集体情报
From prediction markets to interpretable collective intelligence
论文作者
论文摘要
我们概述了如何创建一种机制，该机制提供了一种最佳的方式，从任意的专家组中引发了一种任意逻辑命题的真理的可能性以及具有明确形式并解释这种概率的集体信息。也就是说，我们为开发自我解决的预测市场的可能性提供了强有力的论点，可以激励专家之间的直接信息交流。这种系统尤其可以同时激励许多专家以非常有效的方式共同解决科学或医学问题。我们还注意到，在我们的考虑因素中，专家被认为是贝叶斯人。
We outline how to create a mechanism that provides an optimal way to elicit, from an arbitrary group of experts, the probability of the truth of an arbitrary logical proposition together with collective information that has an explicit form and interprets this probability. Namely, we provide strong arguments for the possibility of the development of a self-resolving prediction market with play money that incentivizes direct information exchange between experts. Such a system could, in particular, motivate simultaneously many experts to collectively solve scientific or medical problems in a very efficient manner. We also note that in our considerations, experts are not assumed to be Bayesian.
