论文标题
在最后通游戏中固定对社会公平的控制
Pinning control of social fairness in the Ultimatum game
论文作者
论文摘要
体面的社会公平是社会经济活动和个人的高度期望，因为它是我们社会福利和可持续性的基石之一。因此，如何有效促进公平水平成为要解决的重要问题。在这里，通过采用固定控制程序，我们发现，当一小部分人被钉住成为最后通atum游戏中的公平参与者时，整个人口就会出乎意料地演变成充分的公平水平。基本观察结果在均质网络中非常强大，但是固定数字的汇合时间显示了不同基础拓扑的不同定律。对于异质网络，这种杠杆效应更为明显，即一个枢纽节点足以实现该目标，并且可以应用定期的开关控制程序来进一步节省控制成本。当固定控制略有强大时，会看到间歇性故障，我们的统计分析表明某种批判性。我们的工作表明，固定控制程序有可能是在必要时促进某些实际情况的社会公平性的好策略。
Decent social fairness is highly desired both for socio-economic activities and individuals, as it is one of the cornerstones of our social welfare and sustainability. How to effectively promote the level of fairness thus becomes a significant issue to be addressed. Here, by adopting a pinning control procedure, we find that when a very small fraction of individuals are pinned to be fair players in the Ultimatum Game, the whole population unexpectedly evolves into the full fairness level. The basic observations are quite robust in homogeneous networks, but the converging time as a function of the pinning number shows different laws for different underlying topologies. For heterogeneous networks, this leverage effect is even more pronounced that one hub node is sufficient for the aim, and a periodic on-off control procedure can be applied to further save the control cost. Intermittent failures are seen when the pinning control is marginally strong, our statistical analysis indicates some sort of criticality. Our work suggests that the pinning control procedure could potentially be a good strategy to promote the social fairness for some real scenarios when necessary.
