论文标题
谁能从巴西市政府的政治联系中受益
Who Benefits from Political Connections in Brazilian Municipalities
论文作者
论文摘要
提高公共部门效率的一个主要问题是了解公共任命在多大程度上是基于工人的能力，而不是被用来奖励政治支持者（赞助人）。我通过确定哪种类型的工人从政治联系中受益最大，为最近的文献记录了公共部门就业的光顾。在（经验支持的）假设下，在封闭选举中，选举的结果与随机性一样好，我估计有因果林以确定与获胜市长党派有条件平均治疗效应的异质性。与以前的文献相反，对于大多数职位，我们在教育方面都有积极的选择，但对（估计）能力进行了负面选择。总体而言，新隶属于获奖候选人政党的失业工人或低任期雇员从政治联系中受益最大，这表明这些人被用于光顾。
A main issue in improving public sector efficiency is to understand to what extent public appointments are based on worker capability, instead of being used to reward political supporters (patronage). I contribute to a recent literature documenting patronage in public sector employment by establishing what type of workers benefit the most from political connections. Under the (empirically supported) assumption that in close elections the result of the election is as good as random, I estimate a causal forest to identify heterogeneity in the conditional average treatment effect of being affiliated to the party of the winning mayor. Contrary to previous literature, for most positions we find positive selection on education, but a negative selection on (estimated) ability. Overall, unemployed workers or low tenure employees that are newly affiliated to the winning candidate's party benefit the most from political connections, suggesting that those are used for patronage.
